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i . 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN T H E NINETEENTH CENTURY. 
YOU have requested me to write you for your new quarterly mag-azine a review of the philosophy of contemporary Germany 
as manifested in its most important tendencies and endeavors. In 
setting out to comply with your wish, I feel that this is no simple task. 
With mere titles of books neither you nor your public will be satis-
fied. T h e readers of The Monist will demand a deeper insight into 
the workshops of German philosophy ; they will want to know if 
the old mother soil of speculative thought has retained its pristine 
fertility. Fert i le it has remained. But in quite another sense from 
formerly. In a few years a century will have elapsed since Schelling 
published in the Philosophische Journal of Nie thammer and Fichte , 
his " G e n e r a l Survey of Modern Philosophical L i te ra ture , " and it 
is well to recall to mind that treatise and that period in a t tempt ing 
to characterise the present state of philosophy in Germany ; con-
trasts, we all know, are quite as important for the acquisition of 
knowledge as resemblances. One central problem stood at that 
time predominantly in the foreground ; the problem, namely, of 
the unification of knowledge. Neither the idea nor the tendency it 
involves, is unknown to the philosophy of to-day, but its meaning 
has become a different one. At that epoch it was sought to solve 
the problem from within, to solve it from the centre ; it was sought 
to find a supreme species of knowledge possessing a certainty 
founded unconditionally in itself, and to expand this dialectically 
into a system of ideas. 
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I do not need to set forth here the great and peculiar acquisi-
tions that this method has won for us, nor to point out what wealth 
of noble power was dissipated by it in the treatment of impossible 
problems. These things belong to history. The speculative period 
of German philosophy is dead. Ludwig Feuerbach in the middle 
of this century sung its funeral dirge. But it took some time 
before people accustomed themselves to regard it as really dead,— 
a time in which countless a t tempts were made to resuscitate it ; it 
took some time before philosophers began generally to bestow upon 
the corpse the kicks of abuse that Schopenhauer in its own lifetime 
administered to it, and for which he was rebuked by a universal 
silence of indignation. 
Earlier history, still under the influence of the speculative 
masters, had characterised the progress of German philosophy from 
Kant to Hegel as the necessary and logical evolution of the idea of 
philosophy in its highest sense. But the present prevailing method 
of presentation is accustomed to draw a sharp, deep line at the 
termination of Kant 's activity, and to regard the entire subse-
quent speculative development of the Kantian philosophy as a 
fallacious digression and an abandonment of the fundamental criti-
cal idea. " Back to Kant " i s the watchword that has resounded 
since the beginning of the sixties, at first in solitary utterances, and 
then with greater, ever-increasing emphasis—the incipient condem-
nation of a period in which German philosophy had celebrated its 
grandest and most brilliant t r iumphs, and at a time when German 




Back to Kant. Yes. But .to which Kant ? To the Kant of 
the first or the second edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason ? 
T o the Critique of the Pure or the Critique of the Practical Reason ? 
Very perplexing questions these. The philosophy of Kant is not so 
easily reducible to a simple and comprehensive formula. It is a 
veritable Proteus, that changes at will form and appearance. 
Every one interprets it, in the end, as he wishes Kant should have 
thought. The cry " Back to Kant " has become in the ranks of 
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German philosophers a veritable apple of discord. An enormous 
Kantian literature has sprung up ; critical, exegetical, constructive. 
No one can dispute it acumen, learning, erudition, and profundity. 
But the traits of Alexandrianism unmistakably cling to it. A 
more pernicious waste of intellectual power, perhaps, than that of 
the much deplored speculative period. One has the feeling often 
as if one would like to cast into the tumultuous, struggling crowd 
of combatants a different battle c r y — " B a c k to Nature ! Back to 
to the examination of the true contents of things ! " 
I shall select on this occasion from the superabundant store of 
Kantian literature the works of two writers only to whom the char-
acterisation just advanced does not apply, and to whom inde-
pendent and fundamental importance belongs. They are, first, 
E R N S T L A A S , * professor at the University of Strassburg, who died 
in 1885, and second, ALOIS RiEHL,f formerly of Gratz, now of Frei-
burg. Both began with Kantian research. Neither remained iden-
tified with it. Both sought to supply a new foundation for that 
branch of philosophy that deals with the theory of cognition ; both 
brought to the service of their task, in addition to eminent critical and 
analytical acumen, comprehensive historical knowledge. Widely 
different in method, both pursued the same end—the eradication of 
that t ranscendent bias which had so pernicious an influence with 
Kant himself and his immediate followers, and the replacing of 
all dualistic opposition of a higher and a lower, or a real and a 
phantom world, by a philosophy of reality based upon the rigid 
analysis of pure experience. Both, therefore, are, in this sense, 
indispensable preconditions of every monistic philosophy that is 
not founded on immediate intellectual perception, or mere postu-
lates, but aims at a critical foundation. 
* 
* * 
Simultaneously with this battle for the " r e a l " Kant and the 
measure of that in his philosophy which could be utilised as the 
* Laas , Idealismits und Posilivismus, 3 Vols. 1876-87. 
f Riehl , Der pliilosophischc Kriticismus und seine Bedentungfiir die positive 
Wisscnschaft, 3 Vols. 1876-87. 
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groundwork of a new structure conforming to the conditions of the 
times, German philosophy in the second half of this century waged 
another war. No fratricidal struggle this, no mere scholastic feud, 
but a battle for existence with a foreign foe—the physical sciences. 
After the speculative philosophy had retired from the throne 
that it had so long occupied, and the vacancy seemed yet unfilled, 
the a t tempt was made to place in the unoccupied seat another in-
tellectual power whose credit and authority with the contemporary 
world had begun to keep pace with the success that at tended its en-
deavors. W e shall designate these a t tempts briefly as " material-
ism," and understand by the term any and every endeavor that aims 
at constructing a conception of the world with the means and 
methods of the mathematical and mechanical sciences alone. Tha t 
which was here sought after was the exact opposite of the state of 
things that obtained in the speculative period ; and the t reatment that 
the speculative philosophy had to submit to at the hands of many 
of the spokesmen of the new movement was not entirely undeserved. 
The battle that German philosophy here had to fight was no easy 
one. Its foe occupied every position of vantage. The real or ap-
parent exactness of its principles, the detailed character of the 
structure of the world that it bade fair to offer were a power. W h a t 
we want is facts, not ideas ; intelligibility, not profundity—these 
were the demands with which philosophy was confronted. It was 
impossible to outflank, in this direction, the representat ives of a 
scientific discipline that admitted of skilful popularisation. There 
was nothing similar to oppose to it. Philosophers were accordingly 
compelled to confine themselves to criticism, to show forth the un-
mistakable defectiveness of the pure-mechanical philosophy, the 
weaknesses and flaws in its demonstrat ions and the arbitrary char-
acter of its construction ; and to point out by a display of much 
acute reasoning what fifty years before was self-evident, that mind 
and mental life are not merely an accidental phase of things, not a 
product incidentally resulting, but an indestructible feature of the 
inward nature of the world itself. 
Much of this extensive antimaterialistic literature, in which 
may also be included by far the greater part of anti-Darwinian lit-
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erature, can put forth no claim to lasting worth, and is to-day 
wholly antiquated. For the simple reason that people no longer 
understand, or at least will soon no longer be able to understand, 
the circumstances and conditions out of which this polemical activity 
sprung : namely—the transcendent metaphysical philosophy ; mis-
taken idealism which imagined that existence and reality had to be 
transfigured in and by cognition instead of through will and action ; 
the secret fear of an endangerment or indeed of a dislodgment of 
the religio-theological world-conception, the supernatural God-idea, 
the pure spiritual and immortal soul, the freedom of the will, and 
other phantoms whatsoever the designations they may bear. 
But this warfare against materialism, which was waged by 
minds of widely varying rank and power, resulted at least in the 
substantial advantage of having brought the hostile parties closer 
together, of having forced them to the reciprocal study of their 
respective means of investigation, and of having put an end to the 
complete estrangement that formerly existed between them. Not 
only did it enrich philosophy, but it also led physical science to a 
correction of many of its conceptions and to a re-examination of its 
methodological hypotheses. 
This is best to be studied, perhaps, by taking to hand the writ-
ings of a man who may be characterised pre-eminently as a spokes-
man of the materialistic movement in Germany ,—I mean JAKOI; 
MOLESCHOTT. His well known work Der Kreislauf des Lcbens has 
become in its last, the eighth edition, something quite different from 
what it was in its first; and the rich collection of his lesser writings 
(Kleinerc Schriftcn, 1 Vols., 1879-87) also offers the philosopher, 
especially from a methodological point of view, much that is worthy 
of especial attention. Moreover, this reciprocal influence of mind 
upon mind is manifested in the case of many of the most distin-
guished investigators of the last thirty years, in the most remark-
able and gratifying manner. It is impossible to study the discourses 
and treatises of physiologists like Du BOIS-REVMOND and WILHEL.M 
PREYER, of physicists like HEEMHOLTZ and E R N S T MACH, and the dis-
cussions occasioned by their works, without being surprised at the 
extent to which the points of view of psychology and of the theory 
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of cognition have penetrated into the problems and inquiries of the 
physical sciences. And vice versa philosophical works, like F R . A. 
LANGE'S History of Materialism (Geschichte des Materialismus und 
Kritik seiner Bedeittung in der Gegenwart), UEBERWEG'S Collected 
Essays (Gesammelte Abhandlungen, just recently edited in a com-
mendable manner by Moritz Brasch), the numerous works of Luu-
WIG N O I R E , and, last but not least, the entire scientific activity of 
W I L H E L M W U N D T , — a l l show an intimate familiarity with the methods 
of the physical sciences and an assimilation of materials from these 
branches of knowledge such as the speculative period can furnish 
no example of. 
* 
* * 
Nevertheless, this intellectual revolution, far-reaching as it was, 
has led neither to solid systematic construction nor even to the suc-
cessful development of positive methods of thought. Since the de-
cline of speculative philosophy,—in which in this connection the Her-
bartian may also be included,—two systems only have dominantly 
influenced the German mind : the system of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER 
and that of HERMANN LOTZE. In both a resonance still lingers of 
the older time. In Schopenhauer we detect the spirit of Schelling's 
nature- and ar t -phi losophy; in Lotze, traces of the finely studied 
subtlety of Herbar t ian metaphysics. But though both are indebted 
for a portion of their real intrinsic worth to this organic though in-
voluntary connection with a great epoch, their influence upon the 
present time rests upon very different grounds ; and primarily upon 
the symmetrical, finished, and compact totality of their intellectual 
creations. They arose at a time in which philosophers had begun 
to lay aside the older systems as useless, and in which that multi-
tudinous dismemberment of knowledge already began to make itself 
felt which to-day seems to be still growing greater. Although it may 
be difficult in many phases of the development of science to satisfy 
the impulse latent in us to unify knowledge, and al though this en-
deavor is characterised ever anew by the representatives of special 
research as a delusion, nay as a ruinous delusion,—yet this impulse 
is not to be eradicated from the human mind and in some way or 
other it will ever procure itself recognition. Works like Die Welt 
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als Wille unci Vorstellung (World as Will and Idea) , or Der Mikro-
kosmus (Microcosm) embrace in fact the entire sphere of knowledge, 
not in an extensive, but in an intensive sense : they furnish a 
definite view of the complete inter-relation and meaning of life. 
It will perhaps appear strange to the reader that works are here 
mentioned in the same breath and their effects upon the present 
time discussed, which are separated in origin from each other by a 
space of about forty years. Yet this very anomaly is characteristic 
of the development of the German mind. W h e n Schopenhauer 
published, in 1819, his principal work, the time for it had not yet-
come. The philosophy of Hegel, a rationalistic panlogism, was 
then in the very midst of its career of t r iumph. The irrationalistic 
and pessimistic elements of Schopenhauerian thought were repul-
sive. W e now know that the two first editions of the Welt als 
Wille unci Vorstellung mouldered in the shops of the booksellers. 
Not until shortly before Schopenhauer 's death in i860 did the lit-
erary public and the scholastic circles of Germany begin to occupy 
themselves more seriously with this philosopher. Not until then 
did he really enter as an active factor into our intellectual life. 
This influence, in the case both of Schopenhauer and Lotze, 
rests, aside from the fact of the universal character of their thought-
creations, already referred to, pre-eminently in the circumstance 
that both made thoroughly their own the scientific theory of things 
and recognised that conception as one whose justification was con-
tained in itself, and which, regarded from the standpoint of its own 
hypotheses, was irrefutable; though they were nevertheless far re-
moved from perceiving in it the final and irreversible verdict of human 
knowledge. In this endeavor to fix the limits of scientific cognition 
Schopenhauer and Lotze form important pillars of the antimater-
ialistic movement in Germany, and are just in this respect also 
intimately related with the task of the modern Critical Philosophy 
or Neo-Kantianism. But while the latter movements came to a 
stop with predominantly negative or preparatory criticism, Schopen-
hauer and Lotze owe a great portion of their wide-spread influence 
on German culture to the circumstance that they undertook, from 
the point of view of the critical theory of knowledge already ac-
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quired, to sketch the plans of structures of the world which would 
furnish, a general background and scheme of synthetic connection 
for the collective special results of the physical and mental sciences. 
That these sketches of world-construction have an individual color-
ing can only lessen their value in the eyes of those who believe they 
are privileged to apply to such a synthetic, constructive formula-
tion of the highest ideas of all existence and thought, the s tandard 
of the exact determination of a single law. And so I shall only 
hastily point to the fact, that the contrariety and oppositeness that 
permeates the world and all our thought about the world also comes 
sharply to light in the case of these two philosophers, not to their 
mutual destruction, but to the heightenment of the effect by the 
contrast. 
The fortunes of the two systems, which began about the same 
time to acquire influence, were dissimilar. The pessimistic ele-
ment alone evinced itself fruitful, in the sense that it came imme-
diately into contact with general culture through manifold forms of 
presentation and extensive discussion. The royal structure of the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy has given a host of dispensing dray-
men for thirty years an abundance to do. The leader of this arm}', 
EDUARD VON HARTMANN, has long since taken a place by the side 
of the sage of Frankfort , as independent master-builder, and pre-
sented a system planned and executed with the most diffuse 
architectural details. The nuclear idea of the Philosophy of the 
Unconscious {Die Philosophic ties Unbcwussteri) has been amplified 
by the author himself in every direction, extended, exhibited in'its 
historical relationships, and applied to the special depar tments of 
philosophical science. The theory of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, 
the philosophy of religion have all been treated of by Ha r tmann in 
the last two decades in voluminous works, and often repeatedly 
elaborated. In addition thereto, come several volumes of essays in 
which the philosopher has had something to say upon every con-
ceivable topic, political, literary, aesthetical, pedagogical, and polit-
ico-economical. Har tmann ' s fecundity is only surpassed by his 
volubility. In him appears anew that union of philosophy and 
journalism that had remained disunited since the close of the period 
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of illumination. T h e utility, nay the necessity, of this combina-
tion, with which, unfortunately, the academical philosophy of the 
passing century would have naught to do, Har tmann knew the 
value of, and skilfully exhibited his appreciation ; though one often 
wishes that its popular character had, in places, been made to do 
service in behalf of different ideas. 
The writings of no other philosopher have obtained so wide a 
circulation as those of Har tmann . His chief work, " T h e Philos-
ophy of the Unconscious ," first published in 1870, has long since 
been put in stereotype form, and from time to t ime passes through 
repeated new editions. Also his numerous other writings have for 
the greater part been repeatedly republished. W e possess a collec-
tion entitled " S e l e c t W o r k s , " and have just received a " P o p u l a r 
Edi t ion ." And it is moreover generally known that it has only 
been since the appearance of the Philosophy of the Unconscious, 
that the sale of the writings of Schopenhauer has assumed great 
proportions. Through the mediation of Har tmann Schopenhauer 's 
fundamental ideas first reached the general public. 
* 
* * 
The philosophy of Lotze lacked an interpreter of like versatility 
and fecundity, although it had need of such a one in a much higher 
degree. Both thinkers were masters of the philosophical style. But 
Lotze 's symmetrically rounded and intricate periods, with their in-
exhaustible influx of incident relations, makes very different demands 
upon the patient resignation of the reader than the lightly moving, 
epigrammatically pointed style of Schopenhauer . Lotze for this 
reason never really became popular. His influence has remained 
rather a scholastic and academic one. I t has been fruitful in high de-
gree in its effect on the special depar tments of philosophical science, 
particularly on psychology, whose present representat ives in Ger-
many almost without exception received from him incitation and a 
solid scientific view-point. Not unimportant , too, is his influence 
upon academic instruction in phi losophy,through the " D i c t a t i o n s " 
to his lectures, published after his death, which are in every s tudent 's 
hands and serve in many ways as a subst i tute for the study of his 
principal work. Lotze 's authority, finally, s tands like a rock with 
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all whose great concern it is to find ways of reconciling the claims of 
theology and of religious belief with the present state of science. 
And their number is by no means inconsiderable. Official Ger-
many has become pious, or, at least, would like to appear s o ; and 
al though this is not to be understood exactly in the sense of especial 
dogmatic zeal, yet people adhere nevertheless with a certain tenacity 
to the religious background of the prevailing world-conception. 
Abroad it is the custom to regard the Germans upon the whole as a 
nation of atheists, because they have produced several curious 
fellows like Strauss and Feuerbach, enjoy having a good time on 
Sunday, and drink plentifully. Nothing can be more erroneous than 
this opinion. The average German has long since learned to place 
implicit confidence in the declaration of his teachers, that the great 
critical liberal movement of the later Hegelian school is not to be 
seriously taken but to be looked upon merely as the outcome of a 
" pathologically over-excited " epoch. Nowhere in the great civil-
ised countries has freethought practically found so little footing ; 
nowhere is its dependence upon the central powers of govern-
ment greater ; nowhere is it more impossible to wrest even a tittle 
from the authority of the old system of education with its foundation 
laid in the theological world-theory. 
This condition of things, the obstinacy, the timidity with which 
state and public opinion hold fast to religion,—and now in times of 
imminent social danger more so than ever ,—must be borne in mind 
if we wish to understand the comparatively great success that the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer and Har tmann has had in Germany. In 
the support of these two systems the philosophical opposition of free-
thought has simply found expression—the opposition that has arisen 
against the official philosophy, of which it cannot exactly be said 
that it theologises, but which carefully avoids coming into conflict 
with theology, and does not, in its aristocratic academic exclusion, 
endeavor to influence more extended circles. T h e factor that made 
this philosophy of opposition accord with the spirit of the t imes— 
its proximity, namely, to the scientific world-theory—has already 
been emphas i sed ; and the fact that its pessimistic coloring has not 
been changed by its connection therewith will be found intelligible 
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when we consider the turn that pessimism took in the hands of Har t -
mann. Only the quietistic Buddhism that Schopenhauer taught, 
could, in an age of the highest expansion and display of power both 
at home and abroad, appear as an incomprehensible riddle of the 
national mind. The evolutionistic pessimism of Har tmann, however, 
which demands of the individual complete and resigned submission 
to the struggle for existence, although it is able to offer him in the 
remotest background of time no better outlook than the ultimate 
annihilation of existence itself—is in its immediate practical com-
mands too closely akin to an optimistic conception not to satisfy fully 
the needs of life, and is again too analogous to certain cosmological 
prophecies of natural science not to pass as the metaphysical ex-
pression of a truth otherwise accredited. 
As opposed to this state of things Neo-Kantianism or the Crit-
ical Philosophy in its various forms has taken no firm position ; no 
more than its master Kant himself did. To a great extent it makes 
use of the limitations of knowledge that have been critically deter-
mined, in order to leave open behind the same a realm of transcend-
ent possibilities in which religion may lead a passably secured ex-
istence. Behind the greatest critical acumen theological prejudice 
is only too often concealed. 
Few only of the intellectually eminent representatives of this 
movement like Alois Riehl and Erns t Laas exhibit in this respect 
perfect determination and the consciousness that the consequences 
of modern science unavoidably demand the laying aside of current 
religious conceptions and the substitution for them of more correct 
ones. Laas especially, in many passages of his principal work 
(Idealism and Positivism), as also in his readable little treatise 
Kant's Stellung im Conflicte zwischen Glauben und Wissen,* has em-
phasised strongly the view that there can be ideals only for the man 
who acts, and that so-called ideals where mingled with the func-
tion of pure cognition only falsify reality and lead to irresolvable 
conflicts. And Laas likewise belongs to the few who have laid 
* Kant's Position in the Struggle between Faith and Knowledge. 
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prominent stress upon the educational task of modern philosophy 
as a substitute for systems of religious ideas. 
* 
* * 
From the point of view of different systematic hypotheses, 
but substantially with exactly the same tendencies, analogous ideas 
find representation in E U G E N DUHRING, who in versatility of talent 
and literary activity is perhaps to be placed directly by the side of 
Lotze and Har tmann , though the favor in which his works stand 
and the circulation they have obtained fall far below the position of 
the latter. H e presents a different form of positivistic philosophy 
in Germany, a philosophy not preponderantly critical but construct-
ive, and begins with what Ludwig Feuerbach about the middle of 
this century in his Principles of a Philosophy of the F u t u r e {Grund-
scitze einer Philosophic der Zukunff) once propounded as programme. 
His chief work, Cvrsus der Philosophic als strengwissenschaftlicher 
Weltanschauung und Lebensgcstaltung (Course of Philosophy as 
Exact-Scientific World-Conception and Conduct of Life), and the 
treatise against pessimism entitled Der Werth des Lcbcns (The 
Value of Life) sketch a world-picture that is intended theoretically 
to be but the simple conceptual interpretation of the present con-
tents of experience, and therefore rejects the metaphysical construc-
tions of Lotze, as well as the new conceptual mythology of Har t -
mann, and criticistic doubts concerning the objective reality of 
the world given in consciousness. In the practical direction, as an 
offset to the world-throe of humanity, the gladdening power of a 
life and action based on universal sympathy is emphasised. Duh-
ring is a unique, but isolated phenomenon ; standing, like Schopen-
hauer once did, in sullen antagonism towards the official academic 
philosophy, and totally ignored by i t ; unable by virtue of the con-
ditions already delineated to influence wider circles, which the un-
animated rigidity of his manner of presentation does not contribute 
to make easy. Eminen t mental endowment and extensive knowl-
edge are perhaps displayed in a higher degree in his historical 
works {Kritische Geschichte der Allgemeinen Principien der Mechanik*; 
* Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics. 
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Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie *; Kritische Geschichte der Na-
tionalokonotnie und des Socialismus\) than in his systematic treatises. 
Nevertheless, Diihring can at the farthest be regarded only as 
one of the forerunners of that Messiah that is destined for German 
philosophy and German intellectual culture perhaps in the coming 
cen tu ry ; of that man who shall be able to cast up the accounts 
of the work of the present period, with its infinite analyses, its his-
torical comparat ive character, and its pyramidal yield of material, 
and to condense that which now everywhere surges about us like a 
spiritual ether, but nowhere palpable or tangible, into the unity 
of a system that shall point out the pa ths to be followed and shall 
dominate all minds. 
* 
* * 
There are many,—and among them eminent investigators and 
estimable scholars, —who smile at this prophecy as an Utopian dream; 
nay, almost stand in dread of such hopes, as perilous to science. 
The day of systems, say they, is past. Philosophy, too,—perhaps 
it were more proper to say " m e n t a l science,"—is breaking up into 
a number of special sciences, over which it is sought to place a 
general science of knowledge or theory of science, as the last repre-
sentative of that which was once called philosophy and was recog-
nised as the queen of the sciences. 
As intimated, I do not know whether the impulse toward unity 
that inheres in the human mind is to be so easily driven from the 
field ; whether we shall be satisfied in the long run to behold that 
light that irradiates the universe, broken a hundred-fold by the 
prisms of the single sciences. But one thing is certain. The more 
irresolute they are in whom the science of the future places its con-
fidence, the more-actively will they press forward who hold that the 
precious treasure of t ruth has long since been granted unto man, and 
who would fain forge with this heri tage of the past the fetters of the 
future. After the Catholic church under Pius IX. had hurled in the 
face of modern culture and science its frantic Anathema sit, it began 
* Critical History of Philospphy. 
f Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism. 
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under his successor a much quieter, yet far more determined war-
fare. Like one of the famed lianas of the primeval tropical forests, 
it entwines the giant Science, to sap his best powers and slowly but 
surely to stifle his life. Whatever the modern mind with the help 
of freedom won by bitter struggles has gained in the knowledge of 
nature and of history, is twisted and turned, falsified and misin-
terpreted by hundreds and hundreds of busy hands until it has been 
fashioned to fit that ready-made scheme of things composed on the 
one hand of Catholic dogmatical teachings, and on the other of the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. As many representatives as 
secular freethought can show, there will be found beside them to-day 
an ecclesiastical advocatus diaboli who will neither rest nor cease 
until of the hero has been made a wretch and mangy heresiarch. 
Under protection of the principle of free inquiry, and with 
all the helps of science, a warfare of extermination is here car-
ried on against all freedom of mind and all science, which is the 
more dangerous in proportion as the opponent loves to decorate 
himself with the borrowed plumes of science, and as he is able 
skilfully to mask his real designs. Catholicism is striving with untir-
ing efforts to gain by the help of this reformed and modernised 
scholasticism, the mastery of the schools, of education, of the uni-
versities, and of the entire activity of science. And compared with 
the position of the representatives of modern thought it has decid-
edly the advantage. Not only is it in the possession of a unitary 
world-theory, but it defends that theory with most determined vigor 
and heedlessness against all differing views. The representatives 
of modern science, on the contrary, are not so fortunate as to pos-
sess inherited truth and infallible authority, and they not only have 
to contend with the formidable internal dimculties'that stand in the 
way of a unitary formulation of their conception of the world, but 
frequently even avoid entering on this task with determination in 
order to make less prominent the contrast with the religio-theolo-
gical system to which every exact scientific conception of the world 
must of necessity lead. 
Against these aggressive endeavors of the theological mind, 
neither lofty indifference, nor calm historical contemplation, nor 
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mere literary warring will avail. The power of freethought must 
be displayed, and the positive work that it can do must be shown. 
Otherwise the time may come when the fame of rigid scientific 
thought and successful research in special fields will not exonerate 
German philosophy from the reproach of having left the nation in 
the lurch at a period of momentous spiritual crisis. To make useful 
the rich acquisitions of these labors toward the construction of a 
general theory of the world, remains, therefore, the serious task of 
the German philosophy of the future. 
I shall be permitted, perhaps, in a future article to present an 
account of the literature of these special departments. 
FRIEDRICH JODL. 
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